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INTRODUCTION
This case concerns the standards for setting aside a $151,931.64 default judgment
against a nonresident defendant that filed a timely motion under Rule 60(b) asserting lack
of personal jurisdiction and another meritorious defense.
Plaintiffs/Respondents William Judson and Donna Judson ("Judsons"), residents
of Washington County, Utah, filed suit against Wheeler RV, Las Vegas, LLC
("Wheeler"), a Minnesota limited liability company doing business in Clark County,
Nevada. (R. 1.) Wheeler maintains that it does no business in Utah. (R. 39.) Rather
than answering the complaint, Wheeler's counsel obtained an informal extension of time
from the Judsons' attorney to demonstrate that Wheeler was not the proper defendant.
(R. 38.) Before that issue could be resolved, the Judsons unexpectedly filed a notice of
default and an application for a default judgment. One day after issuing the default
certificate and before Wheeler had even received service, the Fifth District Court granted
the default judgment. (R. 19-29,38.)
Wheeler filed a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default judgment for lack of
personal jurisdiction and because Wheeler was not the real party in interest (i.e., that they
had sued the wrong party).

(R. 29-32.)

Despite this Court's teaching that default

judgments are highly disfavored, the district court denied the motion (R. 74) and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court of Appeals' decision was based on two errors that are the subject of this
appeal. First, it held that Wheeler's personal-jurisdiction challenge summarily failed
because Wheeler did not cite subsection (4) of Rule 60(b)—even though it invoked Rule
1

60(b) itself and plainly asserted lack of personal jurisdiction. This holding contradicts
this Court's jurisprudence and overlooks the fundamental nature of a personal jurisdiction
challenge. If federal due process problems are to be avoided, a motion to set aside a
default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction cannot be defeated merely for not citing
one of the numbered clauses of Rule 60(b).
The second error was the Court of Appeals' use of a discarded standard for
determining whether Wheeler stated a meritorious defense justifying setting aside the
default judgment. The court below held Wheeler to the defunct standard of State Dep Y of
Soc. Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983), even though this Court rejected
that standard in Erickson v. Schenkers InVl Forwarders, 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994), and
Lundv, Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000). Because default judgments are so
disfavored, stating a meritorious defense is now essentially a pleading requirement that
requires no actual proof.

Wheeler easily met the correct standard when it asserted

defenses based on personal jurisdiction and failure to sue the proper party.
As explained more fully below, the Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed,
the default judgment vacated, and this matter remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings on the merits of the parties' claims and defenses.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3)(a) and (5).
ISSUES PRESENTED
Certiorari was granted on the following issues, as stated in the Court's order dated
January 28, 2010:
2
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"Whether the court of appeals erred in its treatment of Petitioner's

contention that the district court erred in refusing to set aside the default judgment in this
case pursuant to rule 60(b)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure."
Standard of Review. The district court's decision not to vacate a default judgment
for lack of jurisdiction presents a question of law which this Court reviews for
correctness. See State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)
(distinguishing the standard of review for a motion to vacate a judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction from the standard of review for other rule 60(b) motions).
Preservation. This issue is preserved at R. 30-32 (Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment and Request for Hearing arguing that the district court lacks personal
jurisdiction); see also R. 72 (district court's Findings, Conclusions and Order finding that
Wheeler challenged the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction).
2.

"Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's denial

of Petitioner's motion to set aside the default judgment based on the determination that
Petitioner failed to present a meritorious defense."
Standard of Review. Application of the meritorious defense standard under Rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law that this Court reviews for
correctness. See Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah
1994).
Preservation. This issue is preserved at R. 72-74 (setting forth the meritorious
defense standard in the District Court's Findings, Conclusions, and Order and concluding
that Wheeler failed to satisfy that standard).
3

KEY LEGAL PROVISION
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part:
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; ... (4) the judgment is void ....
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals concerns the standards for

setting aside a disputed default judgment against a nonresident defendant.

The

underlying case involves claims by the Judsons against Wheeler arising out of the sale of
an RV. The Judsons prevailed in the trial court and Court of Appeals. This Court
granted Wheeler's petition for a writ of certiorari on the questions set forth above.
II.

Course of Proceedings
Because this case concerns a default judgment, the critical facts are procedural.

On August 15, 2007, the Judsons filed suit in the Fifth District Court against Wheeler
alleging a variety of claims related to the sale of a recreational vehicle ("RV"). (R. 3-7.)
After being served, Wheeler's general counsel contacted the Judsons5 counsel and
obtained an agreement to extend the time in which to file an ansiwer. (R. 38, 47.)
Counsel for Wheeler explained that the complaint was directed to the wrong defendant
because ownership of the RV dealership had changed since the Judsons' RV purchase.
(R. 38.) Discussions reached an impasse when the Judsons refused Wheeler's request to
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execute a nondisclosure agreement before it produced the financial documents underlying
the sale of the dealership. (R. 38, 47.)
The Judsons sought and obtained a default judgment. Without telling Wheeler, the
Judsons cut short the promised extension of time, filing an application for an entry of
default on Tuesday, November 27, 2007. (R. 19-20.) Notice of the application was
served by mail on Wednesday, November 28, 2007. (R. 20.) On Monday, December 3,
2007, the district court clerk issued a default certificate. (R. 23.) The following day the
district court entered a default judgment for $147,274.08 plus $1,954.50 in costs and
attorneys' fees. (R. 24-25.) Wheeler did not learn of the alleged default before the
default judgment was entered. Wheeler's counsel received the application for entry of
default by mail on Wednesday, December 5, 2007—the day after the default judgment
had been entered. (R. 38.)
Wheeler filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and Request for Hearing
("Rule 60(b) Motion") on February 29, 2008. (R. 30.) The motion cited subsections (b),
(b)(1), and (b)(6) of Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure but not subsection
(b)(4). However, the accompanying memorandum explained the nature of the relief
sought, the court's authority to grant it, and Wheeler's reasons for seeking it. It relied on
Rule 60(b) generally and argued (1) that the Judsons had mistakenly sued the wrong
party; (2) that the default judgment had been the result of a surprise decision by the
Judsons to seek a default judgment instead of informally resolving the proper defendant
issue as agreed; and, most importantly, (3) that the district court lacked personal
jurisdiction over Wheeler. Its jurisdictional objection stated:
5

Further, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a proper basis for personal
jurisdiction. Defendant will be able to demonstrate that it is not the proper
party, and that any assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendant is
highly questionable under the seminal cases of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington . (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v
Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297, Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S.
235, 253, and Burger King v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S 462, 478-482 and
their progeny. Each of the aforementioned cases support Defendant's
position that personal jurisdiction is lacking in this matter due to the lack of
purposeful availment and significant contacts with the forum state.
(R. 32.) This jurisdictional objection was supported by the affidavit of Wheeler's general
counsel, Sharon Nelson. (See R. 30-31 (incorporating affidavit into memorandum by
reference)). She stated that "there are significant personal jurisdictional issues," in that
"Defendant operates its business in Nevada, while Plaintiffs reside in Utah" and that
"Defendant does not purposely avail itself [of] the benefits and laws of the state of Utah."
(R. 63).
Following oral argument, the district court denied Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion in
an order dated June 24, 2008. (R. 68-74.) The court also awarded the Judsons $2,703.06
in attorneys' fees for responding to the motion, bringing the total judgment to
$151,931.64. (R. 74, 83-84.)
Wheeler filed a timely appeal. (R. 80.) On July 23, 2009, a panel of the Court of
Appeals affirmed. See Judson v. Wheeler RVLas Vegas, LLC, 2009 UT App 199, No.
20080688-CA, slip op. at 3 (July 23, 2009) (contained in Addendum-1 ("Add.-l") and
referred to hereafter as "Op.").

Wheeler's petition for rehearing was denied on

September 14, 2009. This Court extended the time to file a petition for certiorari to
November 13, 2009. On January 28, 2010, this Court granted certiorari with respect to
the two questions set forth above.
6

III.

Statement of Facts Alleged in the Complaint
The allegations in the complaint are irrelevant to the issues presented, which

center on procedural questions and not the substantive facts or claims. The Judsons
allege that in 2002 they purchased a 2000 Journey RV from Wheeler RV of Las Vegas
for $124,527.50. (R. 1-2.) They allege that Wheeler failed to disclose at the time of sale
that the RV was a manufacturer's buyback and to execute a limited warranty for
repurchased vehicles.

(R. 2.)

The Judsons claim they later sold the RV but were

ultimately forced to buy it back when it was discovered that the vehicle was an
undisclosed manufacturer's buyback. (R. 3.) Based on these allegations, the Judsons
brought claims for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and statutory violations. (R. 38.)

Their complaint sought compensatory damages of $147,274.08, plus punitive

damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. (R. 8.)
IV.

The Opinion Below
A panel of the Court of Appeals (Judge Thorne writing, with Judge Bench

concurring and Judge Davis concurring in the result) affirmed the district court's denial
of Wheeler's Rule 60(b) motion. Op. at 1 (see Add.-l). As a result, Wheeler remains
bound by the default judgment, including attorneys' fees, of $151,931.64.
The court first addressed Wheeler's argument that the district court had erred by
refusing to set aside the default judgment as void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at
2. The standard of review on this issue is for correctness: "When a party asserts lack of
personal jurisdiction as a ground for attacking a default judgment, the district court is
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granted no discretion, and we review its personal jurisdiction determination as a matter of
law." Id. (citation omitted).
The court below overlooked Wheeler's challenge to the trial court's personal
jurisdiction. In spite of the clarity with which Wheeler asserted the absence of personal
jurisdiction in its Rule 60(b) motion—e.g., "personal jurisdiction is lacking" (R. 32)—the
court below held that Wheeler's jurisdictional defense to the default judgment was
waived because "[Wheeler] did not request relief from the district court under rule
60(b)(4)." Op. at 2.
Nevertheless, the court below addressed the adequacy of Wheeler's personal
jurisdiction defense for the purpose of determining whether it was meritorious under Rule
60(b)(1).1 To state a "meritorious defense," the court explained, " c a party must 'present[
] a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would preclude total or partial
recovery by the claimant.'" (quoting inter alia Lund, 2000 UT 75, \ 28).
Analyzing Wheeler's jurisdictional defense together with its defenses of "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" {see Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)), the court
below held that "Wheeler did not make a clear and specific proffer of a meritorious
defense." Op. at 2. It acknowledged that Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion asserted lack of
personal jurisdiction by stating "that [Wheeler] 'will be able to demonstrate that. . . any

1

On this point the decision below is unclear. It concludes that Wheeler "did not request
relief from the district court under rule 60(b)(4)" with respect to Wheeler's jurisdictional
argument but then addresses that same argument under the rubric of Rule 60(b)(1), even
though subsection (1) does not address the lack of personal jurisdiction as a ground for
vacating a default judgment. Op. at 2-3. For purposes of this brief, we have taken the
decision below as we find it when addressing its errors.
8

assertion of personal jurisdiction over [it] is highly questionable.'" Op. at 3. It also
acknowledged that Wheeler's motion contained an additional argument that "'[the
Judsons] have sued the wrong party' because [Wheeler] 'did not own the subject
dealership when [the Judsons] purchased the recreational vehicle.'" Id. at 2. But the
court rejected both defenses out of hand for lack of particularity. The court reasoned that
Wheeler "failed to identify any particular problem with personal jurisdiction" and that it
"failed to assert that Wheeler did not assume the liabilities of its predecessor in interest
when it purchased the dealership . . . ." Id. at 3 (emphasis added). On those grounds, the
court below ruled that Wheeler's "summary assertions of potential defenses, even when
supplemented] by the attached affidavits, did not constitute 'a clear and specific proffer
of a defense' under the circumstances." Id.
Noting "the district court's factual findings and Wheeler's pleading failures," the
court concluded that "the district court did not exceed the boundaries of its discretion or
otherwise err when it denied [Wheeler's] rule 60(b) motion, even if the default judgment
itself may have been improvidently granted under the totality of the circumstances now
alleged by [Wheeler]." Id
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Default judgments must be vacated and the case reopened when a defendant like
Wheeler plainly and reasonably asserts the absence of personal jurisdiction. The decision
below erred by deeming Wheeler's jurisdictional argument waived merely because its
2

The court also rejected Wheeler's argument that denying its Rule 60(b) Motion was an
abuse of discretion because of the "strong policy in favor of allowing parties to resolve
their disputes on the merits." Id. (citations omitted).
9

Rule 60(b) Motion omitted an exact citation to subsection (4).

That motion was

indisputably brought under Rule 60(b) and contained Wheeler's unambiguous argument
that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction. Wheeler needed to do no more. The
validity of a personal jurisdiction challenge to a default judgment does not and should not
turn on whether an out-of-state defendant cites subsection (4) of Rule 60(b). If indeed the
trial court lacked personal jurisdiction, it lacked power to act regardless of the niceties of
pleading. That the decision below deemed Wheeler's jurisdictional argument waived was
error and should be reversed.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals' rejection of Wheeler's defenses under the
meritorious defense standard was error. That standard looks to the face of a pleading or
motion, not to the quantum of proof. By demanding greater factual detail from Wheeler's
Rule 60(b) Motion, the court below effectively resurrected the discarded test in State
Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983), for determining when a
defense is meritorious. Unless reversed, the decision below will undermine this Court's
decisions in Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994), and
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000), which expressly rejected
Musselman, and saddle defendants with liability for default judgments based on an
unfairly demanding legal standard.
This Court should reject the analysis of the court below to avoid serious due
process problems under the federal Constitution. Where personal jurisdiction has been
directly and clearly challenged, as here, refusing to set aside a default judgment based on
inflexible interpretations of state procedural rules would violate due process rights under
10

the Fourteenth Amendment. Wheeler specifically raised personal jurisdiction as a ground
for vacating the default judgment—an argument that claims the judgment was void as
unconstitutional. A challenge so fundamental to the district court's power to act cannot
be ignored merely because subsection (4) of Rule 60(b) was not cited or because the
precise flaws in the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction were not laid out in
greater detail. To avoid serious due process concerns, this Court should reiterate its
settled understanding that Rule 60(b) affords relief for defendants like Wheeler that
plainly and reasonably assert jurisdictional and other defenses under Rule 60(b).
ARGUMENT
The decision below is fundamentally inconsistent with this Court's longstanding
Rule 60(b) jurisprudence. Default judgments are plainly disfavored. Although values
like judicial efficiency are important, this Court has taught that resolving cases on the
merits is more so:
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and to move
calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to date. But it is even
more important to keep in mind that the very reason for the existence of
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice
between them. In conformity with that principle the courts generally tend
to favor granting relief from default judgments where there is any
reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial prejudice or injustice
to the adverse party.
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879
(Utah 1975). This Court's decisions hold that "[gjenerally, courts should be liberal in
granting relief against default judgments so that cases may be tried on the merits."
Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149 (Utah 1994).

11

This Court has explained that "[i]n general, a movant is entitled to have a default
judgment set aside under 60(b) if (1) the motion is timely; (2) there is a basis for granting
relief under one of the subsections of 60(b); and (3) the movant has alleged a meritorious
defense." Menziesv. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, t 64, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah 2006) (citing
Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149; Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (plurality opinion)).
undisputed that Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Moti on was timely.

It is

Review was granted to

decide, in effect, whether that Motion contained "a basis for granting relief under Rule
60(b)(4) and whether Wheeler "alleged a meritorious defense." Id. As to each issue, the
Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law.
I.

Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion Meets the Standard for Setting Aside the
Default Judgment for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.
The first issue is "[w]hether the court of appeals erred in its treatment of

Petitioner's contention that the district court erred in refusing to set aside the default
judgment in this case pursuant to rule 60(b)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure." The
short answer is that it did.
Rule 60(b) provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding [when] ... (4) the judgment is void." Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b)(4). A judgment is void when the court lacks personal jurisdiction. See Garcia v.
Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 291 n.5 (Utah 1986) ("A judgment is void only if the court that
3

In any event, timeliness is immaterial to Wheeler's jurisdictional challenge, because
"there is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void." Garcia v. Garcia, 111 P.2d
288, 291 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (addressing the timeliness of a motion to set aside a
judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction).
12

rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or the parties, or if it acted in a
manner inconsistent with due process of law."). Such a judgment must be set aside
because "[a] lack of [personal jurisdiction] is fatal to a court's authority to decide a case
with respect to a particular litigant." Vijil, 784 P.2d at 1132 (citations omitted). This
Court has emphasized that "if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without
denying due process to the one against whom it runs." Id. (citations omitted). Indeed,
the question of jurisdiction is weighty enough that on appeal this Court "do[es] not defer
to the district court" in deciding whether to set aside a judgment for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Id.
Wheeler's Rule 60(b) motion and accompanying memorandum left no doubt that
it was seeking relief from the default judgment, in part, for lack of personal jurisdiction:
Further, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a proper basis for personal
jurisdiction. Defendant will be able to demonstrate that it is not the proper
party, and that any assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendant is
highly questionable under the seminal cases of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington . (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v
Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297, Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S.
235, 253, and Burger King v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S 462, 478-482 and
their progeny. Each of the aforementioned cases support Defendant's
position that personal jurisdiction is lacking in this matter due to the lack of
purposeful availment and significant contacts with the forum state.
(R. 32 (emphasis added); accord R. 39 (Affidavit of Wheeler's General Counsel)
("Defendant does not purposely avail itself [of] the benefits and laws of the state of
Utah.").) Wheeler added in its conclusion that it "has legitimate and valid legal defenses,
including misjoinder and lack of personal jurisdiction."

(R. 32 (emphasis added).)

Wheeler's request to set aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b) for lack of personal
jurisdiction was expressed plainly.

n

The Court of Appeals expressly acknowledged that the motion asserted lack of
personal jurisdiction. Op. at 2-3 (noting that the motion stated that "Wheeler 'will be
able to demonstrate that . . . any assertion of personal jurisdiction over [Wheeler] is
highly questionable.'"). The district court likewise found that Wheeler had asserted lack
of personal jurisdiction in its Rule 60(b) Motion. (See R. 72.)
Yet, the court below refused even to consider Wheeler's personal jurisdiction
argument—a fundamental due process issue that goes to the core of the trial court's
authority to enter a binding judgment—merely because Wheeler did not specifically
"request relief from the district court under rule 60(b)(4)." Op. at 2 & n.2. To be sure,
Wheeler's motion specifically referred to subsections (1) and (6) but not subsection (4)
and formally requested that the default judgment "be set aside, due to mistake,
inadvertence, excusable neglect, and surprise." (R. 29, 32.) But these minor drafting
flaws cannot wipe out Wheeler's unambiguous jurisdictional challenge to the default
judgment.
A reading of Rule 60(b) that rigidly requires a jurisdictional challenge to
specifically cite subsection (4) mistakes the special character of that challenge.

A

judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction must be vacated because that defect "is
fatal to a court's authority to decide a case with respect to a particular litigant" and
therefore "cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs."
Vijil, 784 P.2d at 1132 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). A challenge to personal
jurisdiction in an otherwise proper Rule 60(b) Motion does not evaporate merely because
the drafter omits a precise reference to subsection (4). In concluding to the contrary, the
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court below failed to fully appreciate that jurisdiction is a matter of the court's power, not
the precision with which a party cites a rule. See Garcia, 712 P.2d at 291 ("'Either a
judgment is void or it is valid. Determining which it is may well present a difficult
question, but when that question is resolved, the court must act accordingly.'") (quoting
11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2862 2d ed.
1987)).
No doubt for these reasons, this Court has not required an exact citation to
subsection (4) of Rule 60(b) as a condition of setting aside a default judgment for lack of
personal jurisdiction. This Court's decision in State v. 736 North Colorado Street, 2005
UT 90, 127 P.3d 693 (Utah 2005), was the only authority on which the court below relied
for its holding that Wheeler's personal jurisdiction challenge failed because "(4)" was
omitted from its repeated citations to Rule 60(b). Op. at 2 & n.2. But 736 North
Colorado Street stands for exactly the opposite principle: Rule 60(b) motions should be
adjudicated on their merits and not on the niceties of citation.

There the Court

adjudicated two separate motions to set aside a default judgment as if brought under Rule
60(b)(4) despite the fact that the defendant "did not articulate which prong of rule 60(b)
he brought his motions under." 2005 UT, ^| 3, n.3. This Court's decision in Chatterton v.
Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997), followed the same approach.

There the Court

considered the merits of a Rule 60(b) motion even though it was "not clear precisely
which provision of Rule 60(b) [the defendant] invoked in its attempt to set aside the
default judgment". Id. at 259, n.7.
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The decision below is also contrary to the Court of Appeals5 own cases. In
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, 2 P.3d 451, the defendant
"appealed] from the trial court's denial of his Rule 60(b) motions for post-judgment
relief." Id.^l.

He invoked subsections (1), (2), and (3) of Rule 60(b) but failed to cite

subsection (4) as the basis of his personal jurisdiction challenge. The court found the
omission irrelevant, addressing the merits of the jurisdictional challenge without
suggesting that he might have waived his due process rights merely for failing to cite
subsection (4). Id. ^ 10 ("Although Melvin does not present it as such, the challenge to
personal jurisdiction in the context of an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is
properly brought under Rule 60(b)(4), which permits the trial court to relieve a party
from a void judgment."). Similarly, in Saysavanh v. Saysavanh, 2006 UT App 385, 145
P.3d 1166, the court followed Franklin Covey in addressing a wife's Rule 60(b) motion
to set aside a default decree of divorce for lack of personal jurisdiction. Even though the
opinion describes the wife's motion as "a motion to set aside the default decree of
divorce pursuant to rule 60(b)," id.fflf6-7—without any reference to subsection (4)—the
court ultimately held that the divorce decree was void for lack of personal jurisdiction
without citing a particular subsection of the rule. Id. *| 26.
The court below should have followed this well-established approach and
addressed Wheeler's jurisdictional challenge under Rule 60(b). A fair reading of its
motion demonstrates that Wheeler properly moved for relief under Rule 60(b) and that it
asserted the lack of personal jurisdiction as a reason to grant that relief. That was enough
to assert personal jurisdiction as a defense. See Menzies, 150 P.3d at 504 (a party is
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entitled to relief from a judgment if "there is a basis for granting relief under one of the
subsections of 60(b)"). Both courts below erred as a matter of law by refusing to set
aside the default judgment based on Wheeler's jurisdictional challenge.
II.

Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion Meets the Meritorious Defense Standard
The second issue is "[w]hether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district

court's denial of Petitioner's motion to set aside the default judgment based on the
determination that Petitioner failed to present a meritorious defense." It certainly did.
"A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a default judgment set aside if it is
entitled to be tried."

Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149 (emphasis added).

Requiring a

meritorious defense to be shown seeks "'to prevent the necessity of judicial review of
questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are frivolous.'"

Id. at 1148 (quoting

Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1060 (Durham, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added). Because the
rule is a pleading requirement and not an evidentiary one, "a party need not actually
prove its proposed defenses to meet this standard." Lund, 11 P.3d at 283 (emphasis
added). The standard is met when the defendant "(1) adequately 'showed' the trial court
a (2) proposed defense containing allegations, facts, or claims that, if proven at trial,
would preclude total or partial recovery . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). A showing is
adequate "where a party presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if proven,
would preclude total or partial recovery by the claimant or counterclaimant."

Id.

(emphasis added).
Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion fully met the meritorious defense standard. Judged
on its face, the motion contains "a clear and specific proffer" of at least two proposed
17

defenses to the default judgment, both of which are "entitled to be tried." Id.; Erickson,
882 P.2d at 1149. Wheeler clearly stated there that "[t]he evidence will show that
Plaintiffs have sued the wrong party" and that "Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a
proper basis for personal jurisdiction." (R. 31, 32.) Each defense is supported in the
motion by argument and legal citation (R. 30-32.), consisting of ''allegations, facts, or
claims that, if proven at trial, would preclude total or partial recovery." Lund, 11 P.3d at
283. Erickson and Lund require nothing more.
The court below rejected Wheeler's defenses anyway. It held that Wheeler's Rule
60(b) Motion did not show a meritorious defense because it "failed to assert that
[Wheeler] did not assume the liabilities of its predecessor in interest when it purchased
the dealership, and it also failed to identify any particular problem with personal
jurisdiction." Op. at 3. In other words, the court below denied Wheeler relief because it
"failed to identify" particular facts supporting its defenses. Id. On that basis, the court
held that

Wheeler's

"summary

assertions

of potential

defenses,

even

when

supplemented] by the attached affidavits, did not constitute ca clear and specific proffer
of a defense' under the circumstances." Id. (citation omitted).
This holding was error. In fact, a more direct contradiction of Erickson and Lund
would be difficult to find.

There is no real difference between Wheeler's supposed

"summary assertions of potential defenses" that the court below rejected and this Court's
express endorsement in Lund of "proposed defense[s] containing allegations, facts or
claims that, if proven at trial, would preclude total or partial recovery." 11 P.3d at 283
(emphasis added). The Lund Court held that even bare allegations that a contract was
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breached constituted "a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense" sufficient for Rule 60(b).
Id. at 283-84; accord Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149 n.2 (holding that "a general denial such
as the one offered in this case is sufficient to meet the meritorious defense requirement").
The decision below, if applied in Erickson and Lund, would have produced the opposite
results.
Indeed, the holding below that Wheeler did not show a meritorious defense
because it "failed to identify any particular problem with personal jurisdiction" (Op. at 3,
emphasis added), essentially resurrects the discarded Musselman test.4 Under that test a
Rule 60(b) movant had to "'set forth specific facts showing meritorious defenses to those
allegations in order to have the default judgment set aside.'" Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1148
(quoting Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1057-58) (emphasis added). This Court rejected the
Musselman standard because it "place[d] a high burden on a defendant otherwise eligible
for relief under rule 60(b)," a result this Court found to be inappropriate. Erickson, 882
P.2d at 1148. Because Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion amply met the meritorious defense
standard as enunciated in Erickson and Lund, the decision below was error and should be
reversed.

In committing this error the Court of Appeals may have been influenced by the trial
court, which relied on Musselman expressly. The trial court ruled that "[t]he defendant
has failed to provide the Court with any 'specific and sufficiently detailed facts which, if
proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one entered.'" (R. 73-74
(quoting Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1057)). However, the court below should have been
warned off this error by Hernandez v. Baker, 2004 UT App 462, 104 P.3d 664, which it
cited for the meritorious defense standard. Op. at 2. Hernandez reversed a trial court
ruling that had erroneously relied on Musselman. 104 P.3d at 666-67. The Hernandez
court emphasized that "[t]o proffer a defense, a party does not have to specifically name
the defense and does not have to prove the defense." Id. at 667 (citing Lund, 11 P.3d at
277) (emphasis added).
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III.

The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of Rule 60(b) Should Be Rejected to
Avoid Grave Constitutional Problems.
Reversing the Court of Appeals' decision and vacating the default judgment has

the additional benefit of avoiding weighty constitutional issues that would otherwise
become unavoidable. Nonresident defendants like Wheeler hold federal due process
rights in state courts. "Due process requires that before a court can exercise specific
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the defendant must have had
'minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Parry v. Ernst Home Ctr.
Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1989) (quoting inter alia Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316).
This right, guaranteed with respect to Utah judgments by the Fourteenth Amendment,
cannot be defeated through state procedural requirements that unduly limit its substantive
protections. Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1922) (Holmes, J.) (u[T]he assertion of
Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of
local practice.").
The decision below defeats the federal due process rights of a nonresident
defendant "in the name of local practice." Id.

It effectively requires a nonresident

defendant to cite a specific subsection of Rule 60(b) or forfeit its right to a tribunal with
personal jurisdiction. The decision below also requires that a nonresident defendant
identify particular facts to support a motion to vacate a default judgment for lack of
personal jurisdiction. If this interpretation of Utah procedure is upheld, each of these
requirements would authorize a Utah court to bind a nonresident defendant like Wheeler
to a default judgment when the defendant lacks minimum contacts with the state and
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when the defendant's assertion of the right to be free of such a judgment was "plainly and
reasonably made." Id. That result would defeat federal rights through state procedures.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment was
offended by a state rule that upheld a default judgment against a nonresident defendant
despite insufficient service of process on the ground that the defendant failed to meet
additional pleading requirements. Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, 485 U.S. 80, 86-87
(1988) ("Where a person has been deprived of property in a manner contrary to the most
basic tenets of due process, i t is no answer to say that in his particular case due process
of law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense upon the
merits.'") (quoting Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915)). For the
same reasons, federal courts interpreting Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (substantively identical to Utah's Rule 60(b)) do not require a showing of a
meritorious defense when a defendant asserts the lack of personal jurisdiction:

the

assertion alone is sufficient. See 12 Moore's Federal Practice 3d, § 60.44[5][b] ("Moving
party [under Rule 60(b)] Does Not Have to Prove Meritorious Claim or Defense");
accord Bludworth Bond Shipyard, Inc. v. M/V Caribbean Wind, 841 F.2d 646, 649 (5th
Cir. 1988) (district court must set void judgment aside, "regardless of whether the movant
has a meritorious defense").
This Court has already been presented with a claim that Utah's meritorious
defense rule conflicts with the Fourteenth Amendment. In Erickson, the Court directly
addressed whether requiring "the showing of a meritorious defense in addition to the
other requirements of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure before a default
71

can be vacated, is constitutionally permissible under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Brief of Defendant/Appellant
at 1, Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1147. In support of this claim, the defendants specifically
cited Peralta. Id. at 6. Precisely because it concluded that the meritorious defense rule
can be satisfied easily, the Court reasoned that it need not reach the constitutional
question. See Erickson at 1149 n.2 ("Because we hold that a general denial such as the
one offered in this case is sufficient to meet the meritorious defense requirement, it is
unnecessary to reach [the defedants'] claim that the requirement is unconstitutional")
(emphasis added). Applying the meritorious defense rule to a defendant who challenges
a default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction likely survives Peralta only because
this Court's standard in Erickson and Lund is comparatively undemanding. But if, as the
court below held, a robust Musselrnan-like requirement now applies, grave due process
problems arise.
These concerns are not mere technical infirmities. The decision below lets stand a
substantial injustice against Wheeler. The six-figure default judgment was issued before
Wheeler knew that plaintiffs had applied for an entry of default and therefore before
Wheeler had a fair opportunity to cure. Because of novel and erroneous procedural
requirements that Wheeler could not have anticipated when it sought relief from the
district court, the judgment has remained undisturbed despite a timely Rule 60(b) motion
that asserted a valid personal jurisdiction defense. The refusal of the lower courts to
vacate the default judgment and consider whether they even had jurisdiction over
Wheeler creates serious due process concerns.
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These due process problems can be eliminated if the Court follows the familiar
principle of constitutional avoidance. See, e.g., West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d
999, 1104 (Utah 1994) ("courts should decide cases on nonconstitutional grounds where
possible, including common law or statutory grounds"). Reversing the decision below on
the ground that Wheeler's motion for relief under Rule 60(b) should have been granted
because it was not waived and because the meritorious defense standard was satisfied
will avoid the constitutional issues that would otherwise arise.
CONCLUSION
The decision below is legally erroneous, constitutionally suspect, and leads to an
exceptionally harsh result.

Wheeler respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals'

decision be reversed, that the district court's default judgment be vacated, and that the
case be remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the merits of the parties'
claims and defenses.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Wheeler respectfully requests oral argument because it will materially assist this
Court in adjudicating the legal issues in this appeal.
DATED this 19th day of April, 2010.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Alexander Dushku '
R. Shawn Gunnarson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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Attorneys:
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P. Wilde, St. George, for Appellant
Gary G. Kuhlmann, St. George, for Appellees

Before Judges Thome, Bench, and Davis.
THORNE, Associate Presiding Judge:
Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC (Wheeler) appeals from the
district court's denial of its motion to set aside a default
judgment in favor of William and Donna Judson. We affirm.
The Judsons sued Wheeler over a recreational vehicle that
they had purchased from Wheeler's predecessor in interest. There
were some negotiations between the parties, and Wheeler did not
file an answer to the Judsons' complaint. When negotiations
broke down, the Judsons requested and were granted a default
judgment against Wheeler. Wheeler timely filed a rule 60(b)
motion seeking to set aside the default judgment on the grounds
of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. See Utah R. Civ.

P. 60(b) (1) -1 The district court denied Wheeler's motion, and
Wheeler appeals.
Wheeler now argues that the district court erred in failing
to set aside the default judgment pursuant to rule 60(b) (4)
because the judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction
over Wheeler, a Nevada entity. See generally id. R. 60(b) (4)
(allowing for relief from a "void" judgment). When a party
asserts lack of personal jurisdiction as a ground for attacking a
default judgment, the district court is granted no discretion,
and we review its personal jurisdiction determination as a matter
of law. See Saysavanh v. Saysavanh, 2006 UT App 385, <J 7, 145
P.3d 1166. Here, however, we conclude that Wheeler did not
request relief from the district court under rule 60(b) (4), and
thus, the district court committed no error in failing to grant
such relief regardless of the merits of Wheeler's personal
jurisdiction claim.2
As to Wheeler's request for relief under rule 60(b)(1), we
agree with the district court that Wheeler failed to adequately
present the district court with any meritorious defense against
the Judsons' claims. In order to prevail on a 60(b) motion, "a
party must 'present[] a clear and specific proffer of a defense
that, if proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by the
claimant.'" Hernandez v. Baker, 2004 UT App 462, f 6, 104 P.3d
664 (quoting Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, fl 29, 11 P,3d 277) .
"[I]t is the proffer of the defense, not the supporting facts,
that must be clear and specific." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, Wheeler's motion stated merely that "the* evidence will
show that [the Judsons] have sued the wrong party" because
Wheeler "did not own the subject dealership when [the Judsons]
purchased the recreational vehicle," and that Wheeler "will be
1. Wheeler's motion also cited to rule 60(b) (6), which allows
for relief from a judgment for "any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment," see Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6). However, Wheeler's motion did not specifically
identify any such other grounds justifying relief from judgment.
2. Personal jurisdiction defenses may be raised in a party's
initial 60(b) motion attacking a default judgment, see State v.
736 N. Colo. St. , 2005 UT 90, ^11 8-11, 127 P.3d 693, and a party
who fails to raise a personal jurisdiction defense in its initial
60(b) motion waives that defense, see id. ^ 11 ("We therefore
conclude that a party waives the right to bring [a personal
jurisdiction] defense if the party does not raise that defense in
his initial rule 60(b) motion.").
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able to demonstrate that . . . any assertion of personal
jurisdiction over [Wheeler] is highly questionable." Wheeler's
motion failed to assert that Wheeler did not assume the
liabilities of its predecessor in interest when it purchased the
dealership,3 and it also failed to identify any particular
problem with personal jurisdiction. We agree with the trial
court that Wheeler's summary assertions of potential defenses,
even when supplanted by the attached affidavits, did not
constitute "a clear and specific proffer of a defense" under the
circumstances. See Hernandez, 2 0 04 UT App 4 62, f 6.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's rule 60(b) (1) ruling
on the ground that Wheeler did not make a clear and specific
proffer of a meritorious defense. See id.
Finally, Wheeler argues that the -district court abused^its
discretion in denying Wheeler's 60(b) motion because there is a
strong policy in favor of allowing parties to resolve their
disputes on the merits. See, e.g., Erickson v. Schenkers Int'1
Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994) ("Generally,
courts should be liberal in granting relief against default
judgments so that cases may be tried on the merits.") . Although
we recognize the public policy in favor of resolution of cases on
the merits, the district court is nevertheless entitled to
considerable discretion in deciding whether to set aside a
default judgment. See Lund, 2000 UT 75, \ 9 ("A trial court has
broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a default
judgment."). The district court's discretion is not unlimited,
see id., but in light of the district court's factual findings
and Wheeler's pleading failures, we do not conclude this to be
such a close case that the district court was deprived of the
discretion to deny Wheeler's motion to set aside the default
j udgment.
We conclude that the district court did not exceed the
boundaries of its discretion or otherwise err when it denied
Wheeler's rule 60(b) motion, even if the default judgment itself
may have been improvidently granted under the totality of the
circumstances now alleged by Wheeler. See Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, fl 19, 2 P.3d 451 ("An
appeal of a Rule 60 (b) order addresses only the propriety of the
denial or grant of relief . . . [and] does not, at least in most
cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which

3. This is apparently the very issue on which the Judsons
attempted, unsuccessfully, to obtain documentation from Wheeler
prior to seeking a default judgment.
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r e l i e f was s o u g h t . " ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n marks o m i t t e d ) ) ,
A c c o r d i n g l y , we a f f i r m t h e r u l i n g of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,

W i l l i a m A. Thorne J r . ,
A s s o c i a t e P r e s i d i n g Judge

I CONCUR:

}

.&ZteL

Russell W. Bench, Judge

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

RECEIVED JUL 2 7 2009
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This matter iVs before the court upon Appellant's petition
for rehearing filed August 28, 2003.
Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for
rehearing is denied.
Dated this
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day of September, 2009.

FOR THE COURT:
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WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a
Nevada foreign limited liability company,
dba WHEELER'S LAS VEGAS RV,

Civil No. 070501867

Defendant.

Judge Eric A Ludlow

The plaintiffs hereby submit their proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order regarding the defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and respectfully request
that the Court adopt such findings, conclusions and order.
PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER
This matter came before the Court for hearing on May 15, 2008, on defendant's Motion
to Set Aside Default Judgment. The Court reviewed the motion, the opposition thereto, the
affidavits supporting the motion and opposition, and the file herein. The Court also heard and
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considered the arguments of counsel at the hearing on May 15,2008. Based thereon, the Court
now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

A Complaint in the above-captioned matter was filed on August 16, 2007, and

was served upon the defendant on August 30, 2007.
2.

The Complaint was served upon the defendant on August 20, 2007.

3.

During September, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel was contacted by Sharon Nelson,

attorney for the defendant. Ms. Nelson requested an extension of time to answer the Complaint.
4.

During such conversation, Ms. Nelson informed plaintiffs5 counsel that the

dealership at issue had changed ownership and that the defendant was not responsible for the
plaintiffs' claims in this case.
5.

Plaintiffs' counsel agreed to grant Ms. Nelson an extension to allow her a short

time to provide plaintiffs' counsel with evidence that the defendant was not the proper party in
this case.
6.

After not hearing from or receiving information from Ms. Nelson for some time,

plaintiffs' counsel's office contacted Ms. Nelson's office by phone on October 15, 2007, and
demanded that the requested information be provided or an Answer filed.
7.

On October 30, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel received a fax from Ms. Nelson

containing only a Bill of Sale which was apparently part of a larger contract.

2

8.

On that same date, plaintiffs' counsel's office responded to Ms. Nelson's fax and

informed her that to evaluate the matter, plaintiffs counsel would need to receive the entire
agreement and other documents related to the alleged sale of the dealership.
9.

On November 1,2007, plaintiffs' counsel received a second fax from Ms. Nelson

requiring that plaintiffs' counsel sign a confidentiality agreement before any further documents
would be provided.
10.

Plaintiffs' counsel refused to sign the confidentiality agreement since it was the

defendant that was requesting that the defendant be dismissed from the case and because to do so
could prejudice the plaintiff in using the information in the purchase documents in this case.
11.

After receiving no further information and having no further contact with Ms.

Nelson, on November 27, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel advised Ms. Nelson that plaintiffs would be
seeking the entry of default and default judgment.
12.

An Application for Entry of Default, and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment

werefiledwith the court on November 27, 2007.
13.

A Default Certificate was entered on December 3, 2007, and Default Judgment

was entered on December 4, 2007.
14.

Despite having been advised that the plaintiffs would be seeking a default

judgment and being provided with a copy of the Application for Entry of Default, the defendant's
attorney took no action to prevent the entry of default.
15.

On December 19, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel received a phone call from William

Frazier, the new attorney for the defendant. Mr. Frazier asked plaintiffs' counsel if he would be
3

willing to stipulate to sot aside the Default Judgment based upon his assertion that his client had
purchased the business after the plaintiffs purchase of the motorhome at issue.
16.

While plaintiffs' counsel refused to simply stipulate to set aside the Default

Judgment without some additional evidence, plaintiffs' counsel informed Mr. Frazier of
plaintiffs' counsel's continuing willingness to review any documents he would like to provide.
17.

At the end of the conversation, Mr. Frazier informed plaintiffs' counsel that he

would be obtaining, and would provide plaintiffs' counsel with, documentation to show that Mr.
Frazier's client was not the proper defendant in this matter.
18.

Despite being told again that plaintiffs' counsel would be provided certain

documents by the defendant, plaintiffs' counsel received no further documents and had no further
contact from the defendant's attorney until February 27, 2008.
19.

On February 27,2008, plaintiffs' counsel received a voice-mail message from

defendant's counsel simply indicating that defendant would be filing a motion seeking to set
aside the Default Judgment in this case.
20.

The defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed with the Court

on February 29, 2008, four days shy of three months from the date of entiy of the Default
Judgment.
21.

The defendant was afforded over three months to provide the plaintiffs with the

documents requested by plaintiffs or to file an Answer in this case.
22.

The only statements provided to the Court to demonstrate a meritorious defense to

this action by the defendant are the conclusory statements of defendant's counsel that:
4

a.

"The evidence will show that Plaintiffs have sued the wrong party." See

Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment at p. 3.
b.

Defendants (sic) did not own the subject dealership when the Plaintiffs

purchased the recreational vehicle." Id. at p. 4.
c.

Defendant will be able to demonstrate that it is not that proper party, and

that any assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendant is highly questionable

" Id

From the foregoing, the Court now makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

To be relieved from the Default Judgment, defendant must show: (a) that the

motion for relieffromthe judgment wasfiledwithin three months of the entry of the judgment;
(b) that mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect were present; and (c) that the
defendant has a meritorious defense to the action. See URCP 60(b).
2.

"Excusable neglect" is "the existence of 'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent

person under similar circumstances." Stevens v, LaVerkin City, 2008 UT App 129, \ 27.
3.

To show excusable neglect "the movant must show that he has used due diligence

and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control... .
[A] party must provide the court with specific details that demonstrate due diligence in spite of
uncontrollable circumstances" Id.
4.

"A meritorious defense is one which sets forth specific and sufficiently detailed

facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one entered.
5

Defendant must therefore do more than merely dispute or deny the truth of plaintiff's allegations;
he must set forth specific facts showing meritorious defenses to those allegations in order to have
the default judgment set aside." State vs. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1057 - 1058 (Utah 1983).
5.

Defendant has asserted no basis for finding the existence of mistake or

inadvertence in this case but rather relies on the claims of excusable neglect and surprise.
6.

Defendant did not exercise due diligence in this matter since an answer could

have beenfiledby the defendant at anytime during the more than three months between that date
the Complaint was served and the date the default was entered. Nothing prevented the defendant
from filing such Answer and there were no circumstances outside the control of the defendant
which rendered the defendant unable to file an Answer. An Answer was not filed simply because
the defendant chose not to do so. Based thereon, the defendant has failed to show the existence
of excusable neglect in this case.
7.

The defendant has further failed to establish the existence of surprise.

Defendant's counsel was told that only a short time would be given to provide the documents
requested by plaintiffs' counsel and defendant failed to provide such documents. Further, the
defendant was informed that the plaintiff was seeking a default and a copy of the Application for
Entry of Default was provided to defendant's counsel. Nevertheless, no action was taken by
defendant to prevent or overcome a default being entered until almost three months after the
default judgment was entered.
8.

The defendant has failed to provide the Court with any "specific and sufficiently

detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one
6

entered/5 Thus, even if the Court were to find the existence of a mistake, inadvertence,
excusable neglect or surprise, the defendant's motion is deficient and should be denied.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters
the following:
ORDER
1.

The defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment is denied.

2,

The plaintiffs are awarded their costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in

responding to the defendant's motion, with such amount to be established by affidavit of
plaintiffs' counsel

fcL.
day of.

Dated this ^

^

^

\M£^

Honorable Eric A. Ludlow
District Court Judge
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